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ABSTRACT
We tackle the problem of learning equilibria in simulation-based
games. In such games, the players’ utility functions cannot be de-
scribed analytically, as they are given through a black-box simulator
that can be queried to obtain noisy estimates of the utilities. This is
the case in many real-world games in which a complete description
of the elements involved is not available upfront, such as complex
military settings and online auctions. In these situations, one usu-
ally needs to run costly simulation processes to get an accurate
estimate of the game outcome. As a result, solving these games
begets the challenge of designing learning algorithms that can find
(approximate) equilibria with high confidence, using as few sim-
ulator queries as possible. Moreover, since running the simulator
during the game is unfeasible, the algorithms must first perform a
pure exploration learning phase and, then, use the (approximate)
equilibrium learned this way to play the game. In this work, we
focus on two-player zero-sum games with infinite strategy spaces.
Drawing from the best arm identification literature, we design two
algorithms with theoretical guarantees to learn maximin strategies
in these games. The first one works in the fixed-confidence setting,
guaranteeing the desired confidence level while minimizing the
number of queries. Instead, the second algorithm fits the fixed-
budget setting, maximizing the confidence without exceeding the
given maximum number of queries. First, we formally prove δ -PAC
theoretical guarantees for our algorithms under some regularity
assumptions, which are encoded by letting the utility functions be
drawn from a Gaussian process. Then, we experimentally evaluate
our techniques on a testbed made of randomly generated games
and instances representing simple real-world security settings.
1 INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, game-theoretic models have received a
growing interest from the AI community, as they allow to design
artificial agents endowed with the ability of reasoning strategically
in complex multi-agent settings. This surge of interest was driven
by many successful applications of game theory to challenging real-
world problems, such as building robust protection strategies in
security domains [23], designing truthful auctions for web advertis-
ing [10], and solving (i.e., finding the equilibria of) large zero-sum
recreational games, e.g., Go [19], different variants of Poker [5, 6],
and Bridge [18].
Most of the game-theoretic studies in AI focus on models where
a complete description of the game is available, i.e., the players’ util-
ities can be expressed analytically. This is the case of recreational
games, which are commonly used as benchmarks for evaluating
algorithms to compute equilibria in games [4]. However, in many
real-world problems, the players’ utilities may not be readily avail-
able, as they are the outcome of a complex process governed by
unknown parameters. This is the case, e.g., in complex military set-
tings where a comprehensive description of the environment and
the units involved is not available, and online auctions in which the
platform owner does not have complete knowledge of the parties
involved. These scenarios can be addressed with simulation-based
games (SBGs) [28], where the players’ utilities are expressed by
means of a black-box simulator that, given some players’ strategies,
can be queried to obtain a noisy estimate of the utilities obtained
when playing such strategies. These models beget new challenges
in the design of algorithms to solve games: (i) they have to learn
(approximate) equilibria by using only noisy observations of the
utilities, and (ii) they should use as few queries as possible, since
running the simulator is usually a costly operation. Additionally,
using the simulator while playing the game is unfeasible, since the
simulation process might be prohibitively time consuming, as it
is the case, e.g., in military settings where the units have to take
prompt decisions when on the battlefield. Thus, the algorithms
must first perform a pure exploration learning phase and, then, use
the (approximate) equilibrium learned this way to play the game.
Despite the modeling power of SBGs, recent works studying such
games are only sporadic, addressing specific settings such as, e.g.,
symmetric games with a large number of players [21, 30], empirical
mechanism design [25], and two-player zero-sum finite games [9]
(see Section 2 for more details and additional related works). To the
best of our knowledge, the majority of these works focus on the
case in which each player has a finite number of strategies available.
However, in most of the game settings in which simulations are
involved, the players have an infinite number of choices available,
e.g., physical quantities, such as angle of movement and velocity
of units on a military field, bids in auctions, and trajectories in
robot planning. Dealing with infinite strategies leads to further
challenges in the design of learning algorithms, since, being a com-
plete exploration of the strategy space unfeasible, providing strong
theoretical guarantees is, in general, a non-trivial task.
1.1 Original Contributions
We study the problem of learning equilibria in two-player zero-sum
SBGs with infinite strategy spaces, providing theoretical guarantees.
Specifically, we focus on maximin strategies for the first player, i.e.,
those maximizing her utility under the assumption that the second
player acts so as to minimize it, after observing the first player’s
course of play. For instance, this is the case in security games where
a terrestrial counter-air defensive unit has to shoot an heat-seeking
missile to a moving target that represents an approaching enemy
airplane, which, after the attack has started, can respond to it by
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deploying an obfuscating flare with the intent of deflecting the
missile trajectory. When dealing with infinite strategy spaces, some
regularity assumptions on the players’ utilities are in order, since,
otherwise, one cannot design learning algorithms with provable
theoretical guarantees. In this work, we encode our regularity as-
sumptions on the utility function by modeling it as a sample from a
Gaussian process (GP) [32]. We design two algorithms able to learn
(approximate) maximin strategies in two-player zero-sum SBGs
with infinite strategy spaces, drawing from techniques used in the
best arm identification literature. The first algorithm we propose,
called M-GP-LUCB, is for the fixed-confidence setting, where the
objective is to find an (approximate) maximin strategy with a given
(high) confidence, using as few simulator queries as possible. In-
stead, the second algorithm, called SE-GP, is for the fixed-budget
setting, in which a maximum number of queries is given in advance,
and the task is to return an (approximate) maximin strategy with
confidence as high as possible. First, we prove δ -PAC (i.e., probably
approximately correct) theoretical guarantees for our algorithms in
the easiest setting in which the strategy spaces are finite. Then, we
show how these results can be generalized to SBGs with infinite
strategy spaces by leveraging the GP assumption. Finally, we exper-
imentally eventuate our algorithms on a testbed made of randomly
generated games and instances based on the missile-airplane se-
curity game described above. For SBGs with finite strategy spaces,
we also compare our algorithms with the M-LUCB algorithm in-
troduced by [9] (the current state-of-the-art method for learning
maximin strategies in two-player zero-sum finite games), showing
that our methods dramatically outperform it. 1
2 RELATEDWORKS
Over the last years, the problem of learning approximate equilibria
in SBGs received considerable attention from the AI community.
In this section, we survey the main state-of-the-art works on the
problem of learning equilibria in SBGs, highlighting which are the
crucial differences with our work. Let us remark that the majority of
these works focus on SBGs with finite strategy spaces, while, to the
best of our knowledge, ours provides the first learning algorithms
with theoretical guarantees for SBGs with infinite strategy spaces.
The first computational studies on SBGs date back to the work
of Vorobeychik et al. [29], who focus on n-player general-sum
games, experimentally evaluating standard regression techniques
to learn Nash equilibria (NEs) in such games. Their approach is to
first learn the players’ payoff functions and then compute an NE in
the game learned this way. Gatti and Restelli [11] extend this work
to sequential games. Given the nature of regression techniques,
this approach also works for SBGs with infinite strategy spaces.
However, the proposed methodology does not allow us to derive
theoretical guarantees on the approximation quality of the obtained
solutions, and it does not adopt any principled rule for choosing
the next query to be performed. In contrast, our algorithms are δ -
PAC, and, by exploiting techniques from the best arm identification
literature, they also perform queries intelligently, allowing for a
great reduction in the used number of queries.
A similar approach, which is still based on learning payoff func-
tions using regression, is adopted by some recent works studying
1The complete proofs of our theoretical results are available in Appendices A, B, and C.
finite SBGs with many symmetric players [21, 30]. Their goal is to
exploit the symmetries so as to learn symmetric NEs in large games
efficiently. Wiedenbeck et al. [30] focus on GP regression, since,
as they show experimentally, it leads to better performances com-
pared to other techniques. Subsequently, Sokota et al. [21] provide
an advancement over the previous work, using neural networks
to approximate the utility function (instead of GPs) and providing
a way to guide sampling so as to focus it on the neighborhood
of candidate equilibrium points. These works significantly depart
from ours, since (i) they aim at finding symmetric NEs in large SBGs
with many symmetric players, (ii) they are restricted to games with
finite strategy spaces, and (iii) they do not provide any theoretical
guarantees on the quality of the obtained solutions.
Recently, some works proposed learning algorithms for finite
SBGs, relying on the PAC framework to prove theoretical guaran-
tees [25, 26, 26, 33]. Specifically, Viqueira et al. [26] and Wright
and Wellman [33] focus on learning NEs in n-player general-sum
games. However, their results are limited to the case of finite strat-
egy spaces and cannot be easily generalized to settings involving
infinite strategy spaces, as they do not introduce any regularity
assumption on the players’ utility functions. Moreover, the query-
ing algorithms they propose are based on a global exploration of
the strategy profiles of the game, without relying on specific selec-
tion rules, except for the elimination of sub-optimal strategies. In
contrast, our algorithms exploit best arm identification techniques,
and, thus, they employ principled selection rules that allow to focus
queries on the most promising strategy profiles.
It is also worth pointing out some works that, while being not
directly concerned with SBGs, address related problems. Recently,
a growing attention has been devoted to no-regret learning al-
gorithms in games with bandit feedback [3, 8, 13]. The methods
developed in this framework are significantly different from ours,
as they fit the classical multi-armed bandit scenario where the ob-
jective is to minimize the cumulative regret. Instead, we adopt the
best arm identification perspective, where the goal is to identify an
optimal arm with high confidence. Thus, our querying algorithms
might achieve large regret during the learning process, since they
are focused on a pure exploration task in which exploitation is not
a concern. Moreover, no-regret learning algorithms require strong
assumptions to converge to equilibria in games with bandit feed-
back (such as, e.g., concavity of the players’ utility functions [3]). In
contrast, our theoretical guarantees do not need any explicit require-
ment on the utilities (except for a reasonable degree of smoothness,
encoded by the GP assumption), and, thus, they also hold when
the players’ utility functions exhibit a complex (e.g., non-concave)
dependence on the players’ strategies.
There are also other related problems not directly connected with
SBGs that are worth citing, such as, e.g., meta-game analysis [24],
learning unknown game parameters or players’ rationality models
by observing played actions [14, 15], combining supervised learn-
ing techniques with decision-making in uncertain optimization
models [31], and online learning in games [2].
3 PRELIMINARIES
A two-player zero-sum game with infinite strategy spaces is a tuple
Γ = (X,Y,u), where X ⊂ Rd and Y ⊂ Rd are compact and
2
convex sets of strategies available to the first and the second player,
respectively, while u : X × Y 7→ R is a function defining the
utility for the first player. 2 Since the game is zero-sum, the second
player’s utility is given by −u. A two-player zero-sum game with
finite strategy spaces is defined analogously, with X and Y being
finite sets, i.e., X B {x1, . . . ,xn } and Y B {y1, . . . ,ym }, with
n > 1 andm > 1 denoting the finite numbers of strategies available
to the first and the second player, respectively. For the ease of
notation, letting Π B X × Y, we denote with π B (x ,y) ∈ Π a
strategy profile, i.e., a tuple specifying a strategy x ∈ X for the first
player and a strategy y ∈ Y for the second player.
In this work, we are concerned with the computation ofmaximin
strategies, adopting the perspective of the first player. In words,
we seek for a first player’s strategy that maximizes her utility,
assuming a worst-case opponent that acts so as to minimize it.
Since the game is zero sum, we can assume that the second player
decides how to play after observing the first player’s move, and,
thus, playing a maximin strategy is the best choice for the first
player. 3 Formally, given a first player’s strategy x ∈ X, we denote
with y∗(x) ∈ arg miny∈Y u(x ,y) a second player’s best response
to x . Then, x∗ ∈ X is a maximin strategy for the first player if
x∗ ∈ arg maxx ∈X u(x ,y∗(x)), with π∗ B (x∗,y∗(x∗)) denoting its
corresponding maximin strategy profile. 4
3.1 Simulation-Based Games
In SBGs, the utility function u is not readily available, but it is
rather specified by an exogenous simulator that provides noisy
point estimates of it. As a result, in SBGs, one cannot explicitly
compute a maximin strategy, and, thus, the problem is to learn one
by sequentially querying the simulator. At each round t , the simu-
lator is given a strategy profile π t ∈ Π and returns an estimated
utility u˜t B u(π t ) + et , where et ∼ N(0, λ) is i.i.d. Gaussian noise.
The goal is to find a good approximation (see Equation (1)) of a
maximin strategy x∗ ∈ X as rapidly as possible, i.e., limiting the
number of queries to the simulator. To achieve this, we follow the
approach of Garivier et al. [9] and propose some dynamic querying
algorithms (see Algorithm 1, where Sim(π ) represents a simula-
tor query for π ∈ Π), which are generally characterized by the
following components:
• a querying rule that indicates which strategy profile π t ∈ Π
is sent as input to the simulator at each round t ;
• a stopping rule that determines the round T after which the
algorithm terminates its execution;
• a final guess π B (x¯ , y¯) ∈ Π for the (true) maximin strategy
profile π∗ of the game.
Given a desired approximation ϵ ≥ 0, the objective of the algo-
rithm is to find an ϵ-maximin strategy with high accuracy, using as
few queries as possible to the simulator. Formally, given δ ∈ (0, 1),
2For the ease of presentation, in the following we focus on the case in which X ⊂ [0, 1]
and Y ⊂ [0, 1] are closed intervals. The generalization of our results to the case in
which the strategy spaces are compact and convex subsets of Rd is straightforward.
3This assumption is in line with the classical Stackelberg model in which the second
player (follower) gets to play after observing the strategy of the first one (leader) [27].
4Even though playing a maximin strategy may not be the optimal choice for the first
player if the players are assumed to play simultaneously, this is the case if we require
additional (mild) technical assumptions guaranteeing that π ∗ is an equilibrium point
of the game; see [20] for additional details.
Algorithm 1 Dynamic Querying Algorithm
1: t ← 1
2: do
3: Select a strategy profile π t ∈ Π according
to the querying rule
4: Get estimated utility u˜t ← Sim(π t )
5: Update the algorithm parameters using u˜t
6: t ← t + 1
7: while stopping condition is not met
8: return final guess π = (x¯ , y¯) for the maximin profile
our goal is to design algorithms that are δ -PAC, i.e., they satisfy the
following condition:
∀u P
( u(π∗) − u(x¯ ,y∗(x¯)) ≤ ϵ) ≥ 1 − δ , (1)
while keeping the number of rounds T as small as possible. This is
known as the fixed-confidence setting (see Section 4). An alternative
is to consider the fixed-budget case, where the maximum number
of rounds T is given in advance, and the goal is to minimize the
probability δ that x¯ is not an ϵ-maximin strategy (see Section 5).
Notice that, for SBGswith finite strategy spaces, the δ -PAC property
in Equation (1) can only require u(π∗) − u(x¯ ,y∗(x¯)) ≤ ϵ , since it is
always the case that u(π∗) > u(x¯ ,y∗(x¯)). 5
3.2 Gaussian Processes
To design δ -PAC algorithms working with SBGs having infinite
strategy spaces, we first need to introduce some regularity assump-
tions on the utility functionsu. In this work, we model the utility as
a sample from a Gaussian process (GP), which is a collection of de-
pendent random variables, one for each action profile π ∈ Π, every
finite subset of which is multivariate Gaussian distributed [32]. A
GP(µ(π ),k(π ,π ′)) is fully specified by its mean function µ : Π 7→
R, with µ(π ) B E[u(π )], and its covariance (or kernel) function
k : Π × Π 7→ R, with k(π ,π ′) B E[(u(π ) − µ(π ))(u(π ′) − µ(π ′))].
W.l.o.g., we assume that µ ≡ 0 and the variance is bounded, i.e.,
k(π ,π ) B σ 2 ≤ 1 for every π ∈ Π. Note that the GP assump-
tion guarantees that the utility function u has a certain degree of
smoothness, without relying on rigid parametric assumptions, such
as linearity. Intuitively, the kernel function k determines the corre-
lation of the utility values across the space of strategy profiles Π,
thus encoding the smoothness properties of the utility functions u
sampled from GP(µ(π ),k(π ,π ′)) (for some examples of commonly
used kernels, see Section 7).
We also need GPs in our algorithms, as they use GP(0,k(π ,π ′))
as prior distribution over u. The major advantage of working with
GPs is that they admit simple analytical formulas for the mean
and covariance of the posterior distribution. These relations can
be easily expressed using matrix notation, as follows. Let u˜t B
[u˜1, . . . , u˜t ]⊤ be the vector of utility values observed up to round
t , obtained by querying the simulator on the strategy profiles
π1, . . . ,π t . Then, the posterior distribution over u is still a GP,
with mean µt (π ), covariance kt (π ,π ′), and variance σ 2t (π ), which
5This is in line with the definition provided by Garivier et al. [9].
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are defined as follows:
µt (π ) B kt (π )⊤ (Kt + λI )−1 u˜t , (2)
kt (π ,π ′) B k(π ,π ′) − kt (π )⊤(Kt + λI )−1 kt (π ′), (3)
σ 2t (π ) B kt (π ,π ), (4)
where kt (π ) B [k(π ,π1), . . . ,k(π ,π t )]⊤ and Kt is the positive
definite t × t kernel matrix, whose (i, j)-th entry is k(π i ,π j ). The
posterior parameters update formulas can also be expressed re-
cursively, thus avoiding costly matrix inversions, as shown in [7].
Letting π t and u˜t be, respectively, the queried strategy profile and
the observed utility at round t , we can write:
µt (π ) ← µt−1(π ) + kt−1(π ,π t )
λ + σ 2t−1(π t )
(u˜t − µt−1(π t )), (5)
kt (π ,π ′) ← kt (π ,π ′) − kt−1(π ,π t )kt−1(π t ,π
′)
λ + σ 2t−1(π t )
, (6)
σ 2t (π ) ← σ 2t−1(π ) −
k2t−1(π ,π t )
λ + σ 2t−1(π t )
. (7)
Clearly, at the beginning of the algorithms, the estimates are given
by the GP prior GP(µ(π ),k(π ,π ′)), i.e., formally, µ0(π ) B µ(π ),
k0(π ,π ′) B k(π ,π ′), and σ 20 (π ) B σ 2(π ) = σ 2.
4 FIXED-CONFIDENCE SETTING
In this section and the following one (Section 5), we present our
learning algorithms for the easiest setting of SBGs with finite strat-
egy spaces. Then, in Section 6, we show how they can be extended
to SBGs with infinite strategy spaces.
For the fixed-confidence setting, we propose a δ -PAC dynamic
querying algorithm (called M-GP-LUCB, see Algorithm 2) based on
the M-LUCB approach introduced by Garivier et al. [9] and provide
a bound on the number of roundsTδ it requires, as a function of the
confidence level δ . While our algorithm shares the same structure as
M-LUCB, it uses confidence bounds relying on the GP assumption,
and, thus, different proofs are needed to show its δ -PAC properties.
As shown in Section 6, our algorithm and its theoretical guarantees
have the crucial advantage of being easily generalizable to SBGs
with infinite strategy spaces.
For every strategy profile π ∈ Π, the algorithm keeps track of
a confidence interval [Lt (π ),Ut (π )] on u(π ) built using the util-
ity values u˜t observed from the simulator up to round t . Using
GP(0,k(π ,π ′)) as prior distribution over the utility function u, the
lower bounds of the intervals are defined as Lt (π ) B µt (π ) −√
btσt (π ) and the upper bounds as Ut (π ) B µt (π ) +
√
btσt (π ),
where µt and σ 2t are the mean and the variance of the posterior
distribution computed with observations up to round t (see Equa-
tions (2)–(4)), while bt is an exploration term that depends from
the context (see Theorem 4.1).
At the end of every even round t , the algorithm selects the
strategy profiles to give as inputs to the simulator during the next
two rounds t + 1 and t + 2. For every x ∈ X, let
γt (x) B argmin
y∈Y
Lt (x ,y)
Algorithm 2M-GP-LUCB(ϵ , δ )
1: Initialize t ← 0, µ0(π ) ← 0, k0(π ,π ′) ← k(π ,π ′)
2: do
3: Select π t+1 and π t+2 using Eqs. (8)–(9)
4: u˜t+1 ← Sim(π t+1), u˜t+2 ← Sim(π t+2)
5: Compute µt+2(π ) and kt+2(π ,π ′) using
observations u˜t+1, u˜t+2 and Eqs. (2)–(4)
6: t ← t + 2
7: while Lt (π t+1) ≤ Ut (π t+2) − ϵ
8: return π = (x¯t ,γt (x¯t ))
be the second player’s best response to x computed using the lower
bounds Lt . Moreover, let
x¯t B argmax
x ∈X
min
y∈Y
µt (x ,y)
be the maximin strategy computed using the posterior mean µt .
Then, in the following two rounds, the algorithm selects the strategy
profiles π t+1 and π t+2, defined as follows:
π t+1 B (x¯t ,γt (x¯t )) (8)
π t+2 B argmax
π ∈{(x,γt (x ))}x,x¯t
Ut (π ). (9)
This choice is made so as to advance the algorithm towards its
termination. In particular, the M-GP-LUCB algorithm stops when,
according to the confidence intervals, the strategy x¯t is proba-
bly approximately better than all the others, i.e., when it holds
Lt (π t+1) > Ut (π t+2) − ϵ . For an intuition as to why the selec-
tion of π t+1 and π t+2 allows the algorithm to proceed towards
termination, see [9]. The final strategy profile recommended by the
algorithm is π B (x¯t ,γt (x¯t )).
The following theorem shows that M-GP-LUCB is δ -PAC and
provides an upper bound on the number of rounds Tδ it requires.
The analysis is performed for ϵ = 0, i.e., when π is evaluated with
respect to an exact maximin profile. 6 Note that the upper bound
forTδ depends on the utility-dependent term H∗(u) B
∑
π ∈Π c(π ),
where c(π ) is defined as follows:
c(π ) B 1
max
{
(∆∗)2,
(
u(x ∗,y∗(x ∗))+u(x ∗∗,y∗(x ∗∗))
2 − u(x ,y∗(x))
)2} ,
where, for the ease of writing, we let ∆∗ B u(π ) − u(x ,y∗(x))
and x∗∗ ∈ argmaxx ∈X\{x ∗ } u(x ,y∗(x)), i.e., x∗∗ is a first player’s
maximin strategy when x∗ is removed from the available ones. This
term has the same role as H1 B
∑
i ∈{1, ...,P } 1∆2(i )
used by Audibert
et al. [1] in the best arm identification setting, where, denoting as
π i the i-th strategy profile in Π, we let ∆(i) B |u(π∗)−u(π i )|, with
∆(1) ≤ ∆(2) ≤ . . . ≤ ∆(P ), Intuitively, H∗(u) and H1 characterize
the hardness of the problem instances by determining the amount
of rounds required to identify the maximin profile and the best arm,
respectively.
6Assuming ϵ = 0 also requires the additional w.l.o.g. assumption that the utility value
of an exact maximin strategy and that one of a second-best maximin strategy are
different.
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Theorem 4.1. Using a generic nondecreasing exploration term
bt > 0, the M-GP-LUCB algorithm stops its execution after at most
Tδ rounds, where:
Tδ ≤ inf
{
t ∈ N : 8H∗(u)bt λ − λ nm
σ 2
< t
}
. (10)
Specifically, letting bt := 2 log
(
nm π 2 t 2
6δ
)
, the algorithm returns a
maximin profile with confidence at least 1 − δ , and:
Tδ ≤ 64H∗(u) λ
(
log
(
64H∗(u) λ π
√
nm
6δ
)
+2 log
(
log
(
64H∗(u)λπ
√
nm
6δ
)))
, (11)
where we require that 64 λ π
√
nm
6δ > 4.85.
Intuitively, from the result in Theorem 4.1, we can infer that
the most influential terms on the number of rounds required to
get a specific confidence level δ are H∗(u) and the noise variance
λ, which impact as multiplicative constants on Tδ . On the other
hand, Tδ scales only logarithmically with the number of strategy
profiles |Π | = nm, thus allowing the execution of the M-GP-LUCB
algorithm also in settings where the players have a large number
of strategies available.
5 FIXED-BUDGET SETTING
In the fixed-budget setting, the goal is to design δ -PAC algorithms
that, given the maximum number of available rounds T (i.e., the
budget), find an ϵ-maximin strategy with confidence 1 − δT as
large as possible. We propose a successive elimination algorithm
(called GP-SE, see Algorithm 3), which is based on an analogous
method proposed by Audibert et al. [1] for the best arm identifica-
tion problem. The fundamental idea behind our GP-SE algorithm is
a novel elimination rule, which is suitably defined for the problem
of identifying maximin strategies.
The algorithm works by splitting the number of available rounds
T into P−1 phases, where, for the ease of notation, we let P B |Π | =
nm be the number of players’ strategy profiles. At the end of each
phase, the algorithm excludes from the set of candidate solutions
the strategy profile that has the lowest chance of being maximin.
Specifically, letting Πp be the set of the remaining strategy profiles
during phase p, at the end of p, the algorithm dismisses the strategy
profile πp = (xp ,yp ) ∈ Πp , defined as follows:
(xp , ·) B argmin
π ∈Πp
µp (π ), (12)
yp B argmax
y∈Y:(xp,y)∈Πp
µp (xp ,y), (13)
where µp represents the mean of the posterior distribution com-
puted at the end of phase p (see Equations (2)-(4)). Intuitively, the
algorithm selects the first player’s strategy xp that is less likely to
be a maximin one, together with the second player’s strategy yp
that is the worst for her given xp . Notice that xp is the first player’s
strategy that is less likely to be her maximin strategy, while, in its
turn, yp is the worst second player’s strategy given xp . At the end
of the last phase, the (unique) remaining strategy profile π = (x¯ , y¯)
is recommended by the algorithm.
Algorithm 3 GP-SE(T )
1: Initialize Π1 ← Π, µ0(π ) ← 0
2: for p = 1, 2, . . . , P − 1 do
3: For each π ∈ Πp , query Sim(π ) for
Tp −Tp−1 rounds
4: Compute µp (π ) using observations
5: Select πp according to Eqs. (12)–(13)
6: Πp+1 ← Πp \ {πp }
7: return the unique element π of ΠP
Following [1], the length of the phases have been carefully cho-
sen so as to obtain an optimal (up to a logarithmic factor) conver-
gence rate. Specifically, letting log(P) B 12 +
∑P
i=2
1
i , let us define
T0 B 0 and, for every phase p ∈ {1, . . . , P − 1}, let:
Tp B
⌈
T − P
log(P)(P + 1 − p)
⌉
. (14)
Then, during each phase p, the algorithm selects every remaining
strategy profile in Πp for exactly Tp −Tp−1 rounds. Let us remark
that the algorithm is guaranteed to do not exceed the number of
available roundsT . Indeed, each πp is selected forTp rounds, while
π is chosenTP−1 times, and
∑P−1
p=1 Tp+TP−1 ≤ T holds by definition.
The following theorem provides an upper bound on the prob-
ability δT that the strategy profile π recommended by the GP-SE
algorithm is not ϵ-maximin, as a function of the number of rounds
T . As for the fixed-confidence setting, our result holds for the case
in which ϵ = 0.
Theorem 5.1. LettingT be the number of available rounds, the GP-
SE algorithm returns a maximin strategy profile π∗ with confidence
at least 1 − δT , where:
δT = 2P(n +m − 2)e
− T−P
8λlog(P )H2 , (15)
and H2 B maxi ∈{1, ...,P } i ∆−2(i) .
As also argued by Audibert et al. [1], a successive elimination
method provides two main advantages over a simple round robin
querying strategy in which every strategy profile is queried for
the same number of rounds. First, it provides a similar bound on
δT with a better dependency on the parameters, and, second, it
queries the maximin strategy profile a larger number of times, thus
returning a better estimate of its expected utility.
6 SIMULATION-BASED GAMES WITH
INFINITE STRATEGY SPACES
We are now ready to provide our main results on SBGs with infinite
strategy spaces. In the first part of the section, we show how the δ -
PAC algorithms proposed in Sections 4 and 5 for finite SBGs can be
adapted to work with infinite strategy spaces while retaining some
theoretical guarantees on the returned ϵ-maximin profiles. This
requires to work with a (finite) discretized version of the original
(infinite) SBGs, where the players’ strategy spaces are approximated
with grids made of equally spaced points. Then, in the second part
of the section, we provide some results for the situations in which
one cannot work with this kind of discretization, and, instead, only
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a limited number of points is sampled from the players’ strategy
spaces. This might be the case when, e.g., the dimensionalityd of the
players’ strategy spaces is too high, or there are some constraints
on the strategy profiles that can be queried. Clearly, in this setting,
we cannot prove δ -PAC results, as the quality of the ϵ-maximin
strategy profiles inevitable depends on how the points are selected.
Let us remark that our main results rely on our assumption that
the utility function u is drawn from a GP, provided some mild
technical requirements are satisfied (see Assumption 1).
6.1 δ-PAC Results for Evenly-Spaced Grids
The idea is to work with a discretization of the players’ strategy
spaces, each made of at least Kϵ equally spaced points, where ϵ ≥ 0
is the desired approximation level. This induces a new (restricted)
SBGs with finite strategy spaces, where techniques presented in
the previous sections can be applied. In the following, for the ease
of presentation, given an SBG with infinite strategy spaces Γ, we
denote with Γ(K) the finite SBG obtained when approximating the
players’ strategy spaces with K equally spaced points, i.e., a game
in which the players have n =m = K strategies available and the
utility value of each of the nm strategy profiles is the same as that
one of the corresponding strategy profile in Γ.
First, let us introduce the main technical requirement that we
need for our results to hold.
Assumption 1 (Kernel Smoothness). A kernel k(π ,π ′) is said to
be smooth over Π if, for each L > 0 and for some constants a,b > 0,
the functions u drawn from GP(0,k(π ,π ′)) satisfy:
P
(
sup
π ∈Π
 ∂u∂x  > L) ≤ ae− L2b2 , (16)
P
(
sup
π ∈Π
 ∂u∂y  > L) ≤ ae− L2b2 . (17)
This assumption is standard when using GPs in online opti-
mization settings [22], and it is satisfied by many common kernel
functions for specific values of a and b, such as the squared ex-
ponential kernel and the Matérn one with smoothness parameter
ν > 2 (see Section 7 for details on the definition of these kernel
functions).
We are now ready to state our main result:
Theorem 6.1. Assume that u is drawn from a GP(0,k(π ,π ′))
satisfying Assumption 1. Given ϵ > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 2), let π = (x¯ , y¯) ∈
Π be a maximin strategy profile for a finite game Γ(K) where K is at
least Kϵ B
⌈
b
2ϵ
√
log
(
4a
δ
) ⌉
+ 1. Then, the following holds:
P
( u(π∗) − u(π ) ≤ ϵ) ≥ 1 − δ2 . (18)
The following two results rely on Theorem 6.1 to show that the
M-GP-LUCB (Algorithm 2) and the GP-SE (Algorithm 3) algorithms
can be employed to find, with high confidence, ϵ-maximin strategy
profiles in SBGs with infinite strategy spaces. Let us remark that,
while for SBGs with finite strategy spaces our theoretical analysis
is performed for ϵ = 0, in the case of infinite strategy spaces it is
necessary to assume a nonzero approximation level ϵ .
Corollary 6.2. Assume that u is drawn from a GP(0,k(π ,π ′))
satisfying Assumption 1. Given ϵ > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), letting bt :=
2 log
(
nmπ 2t 2
3δ
)
, the M-GP-LUCB algorithm applied to Γ(K) with K
at least Kϵ B
⌈
b
2ϵ
√
log
(
4a
δ
) ⌉
+ 1 returns a strategy profile π =
(x¯ , y¯) such that P (|u(π∗) − u(x¯ ,y∗(x¯))| ≤ ϵ) ≥ 1 − δ . Moreover, the
algorithm stops its execution after at most:
Tδ,ϵ ≤ 64H∗(u) λ
[
log
(
64H∗(u) λ π Kϵ
√
1
3δ
)
+2 log
(
log
(
64H∗(u)λ π Kϵ
√
1
3δ
))]
, (19)
where we require that 64 λ π Kϵ
√
1
3δ > 4.85.
Corollary 6.3. Assume that u is drawn from a GP(0,k(π ,π ′))
satisfying Assumption 1. Given ϵ > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), letting T be
the number of available rounds, the GP-SE algorithm applied to Γ(K)
with K at least Kϵ B
⌈
b
2ϵ
√
log
(
4a
δ
) ⌉
+1 returns a profile π = (x¯ , y¯)
such that P (|u(π∗) − u(x¯ ,y∗(x¯))| > ϵ) < δT ,ϵ , where:
δT ,ϵ = 4K2ϵ (Kϵ − 1)e
− T−K2ϵ
8λlog(K2ϵ )H2 + 2ae−
b2
4ϵ2(Kϵ −1)2 . (20)
In the result of Corollary 6.3, the discretization parameter Kϵ
depends on a confidence level δ that has to be chosen in advance.
Another possibility is to try to minimize the overall confidence
δT ,ϵ by appropriately tuning the parameter δ . Formally, a valid
confidence level can be defined as follows:
δopt = inf
{
δ ∈ (0, 1) : δT ,ϵ
}
, (21)
noticing that δT ,ϵ depends on δ also through the term Kϵ . Unfor-
tunately, this minimization problem does not admit a closed-form
optimal solution. Nevertheless, we can compute an (approximate)
optimal value for δ by employing numerical optimization meth-
ods [16].
6.2 Arbitrary Discretization
Whenever using an evenly-spaced grid as a discretization scheme is
unfeasible, the theoretical results based on Theorem 6.1 do not hold
anymore. Nevertheless, given any finite sets of players’ strategies,
we can bound with high probability the distance of a maximin
profile π∗ from the strategy profile learned in the resulting (finite)
discretized SBG. Formally, let Xn ⊆ X be a finite set of n first
player’s strategies and, similarly, let Ym ⊆ Y be a finite set of
m second player’s strategies. Thus, the resulting finite SBG Γ =
(Xn ,Ym ,u) has nm strategy profiles. Let
dmaxx = maxx ∈X
min
xi ∈Xn
|x − xi |,
dmaxx = max
y∈Y
min
yi ∈Ym
|y − yi |,
then, we can show the following result.
Theorem 6.4. Assume that u is drawn from a GP(0,k(π ,π ′))
satisfying Assumption 1. Given δ ∈ (0, 2), let π = (x¯ , y¯) ∈ Xn × Ym
be a maximin strategy profile for a finite game Γ = (Xn ,Ym ,u). Then,
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Table 1: Experimental results of algorithms M-LUCB, M-G-LUCB, and M-GP-LUCB on SBGs with finite strategy spaces.
M-LUCB M-G-LUCB M-GP-LUCB GP-SE
T Tδ %end %opt Tδ %end %opt Tδ %end %opt %opt
SQE
l = 0.1 30k 10673.86 53.33 87.13 227.23 96.70 86.73 229.19 93.33 86.66 100.00
l = 2.0 30k 23788.96 13.73 84.80 2460.19 89.23 77.73 2020.89 76.66 93.36 93.23100k 42103.86 46.66 88.63 3535.00 91.86 78.56 5656.77 76.77 93.30 96.60
M1.5
l = 0.1 30k 13869.59 56.06 66.66 222.06 100.00 66.83 224.87 100.00 66.66 100.00
l = 2.0 30k 18978.75 33.33 76.26 2532.98 91.30 76.90 3775.65 88.03 78.86 98.30100k 28798.42 50.00 80.70 3662.00 95.36 77.00 4618.27 93.33 79.53 98.76
M2.5
l = 0.1 30k 13335.26 79.80 86.66 168.61 97.90 86.06 171.62 96.66 86.66 99.83
l = 2.0 30k 20404.41 24.66 89.26 1984.55 92.10 86.63 2435.84 88.24 95.27 95.60100k 49198.82 62.06 92.86 2617.31 93.70 87.13 2626.89 86.66 94.93 96.46
the following holds:
P
©­«
u(π∗) − u(π ) ≤ b√log ( 4a
δ
)
max
{
dmaxx ,d
max
y
}ª®¬ ≥ 1 − δ2 .
Let us remark that the result in Theorem 6.4 can be applied
any time using an evenly-spaced grid as a discretization scheme is
unfeasible, as it is the case, e.g., when the dimensionality d of the
players’ strategy spaces is too large.
7 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We experimentally evaluate our algorithms on both finite and in-
finite SBGs. As for the finite case, we compare the performances
(with different metrics) of our M-GP-LUCB and GP-SE algorithms
against two baselines. The first one is the M-LUCB algorithm pro-
posed by Garivier et al. [9], which is the state of the art for learning
maximin strategies in finite SBGs and can be easily adapted to
our setting by using a different exploration term bt . 7 We intro-
duce a second baseline to empirically evaluate how our algorithms
speed up their convergence by leveraging correlation of the utilities.
Specifically, it is a variation of our M-GP-LUCB algorithm (called
M-G-LUCB) where utility values are assumed drawn from indepen-
dent Gaussian random variables, instead of a GP. 8 As for SBGs with
infinite strategy spaces, there are no state-of-the-art techniques that
we can use as a baseline for comparison. Thus, we show the quality
(in terms of ϵ) of the strategy profiles returned by our algorithms
using different values of Kϵ for the discretized games. The average
ϵ values obtained empirically (called ϵˆ thereafter) are compared
against the theoretical values prescribed by Theorem 6.1 (for the
given Kϵ ), so as to evaluate whether our bounds are strict or not.
7.1 Random Game Instances
As for finite SBGs, we test the algorithms on random instances
generated by sampling from GP(0,k(π ,π ′)), using the following
two commonly used kernel functions (see [32] for more details):
• squared exponential: k(π ,π ′) B e− 12l2 | |π−π ′ | |2 , where l is a
length-scale parameter;
7Since our utilities are not in [0, 1] (as they are drawn from a Gaussian instead of a
Bernoulli), we multiply the bt provided in [9] by the utility range.
8The formulas for updating the mean µt and the variance σ 2t of the posterior distribu-
tion are changed accordingly.
• Matérn: k(π ,π ′) B 21−νG(ν )rνBν (r ), where r B
√
2ν
l | |π − π ′ | |,
ν controls the smoothness of the functions, l is a length-scale
parameter, Bν is the second-kind Bessel function, and G is
the Gamma function.
We set the kernel parameters to l ∈ {0.1, 2} and ν ∈ {1.5, 2.5},
generating 30 instances for each possible combination of kernel
function and parameter values. As for SBGs with infinite strategy
spaces, we test on instances generated from distributions with
l = 0.1 and, with the Matérn kernel, ν ∈ {1.5, 2.5}. The infinite
strategy spaces are approximated with a discretization scheme
based on a grid made of 100 evenly-spaced points.
In the fixed-confidence setting, we let δ = 0.1 and stop the algo-
rithms afterT ∈ {30k, 100k} rounds. Similarly, the GP-SE algorithm
is run with a budgetT ∈ {30k, 100k}. For each possible combination
of algorithm, game instance, and round-limit T , we average the
results over 100 runs.
Results on Finite SBGs. The results are reported in Table 1, where
Tδ is the average number of queries used by the algorithm in the
runs not exceeding the round-limit T , %end is the percentage of
runs the algorithm terminates before T rounds, and %opt is the
percentage of runs the algorithm is able to correctly identify the
maximin profileπ∗. Notice thatM-GP-LUCB andM-G-LUCB clearly
outperform M-LUCB, as the latter requires a number of rounds Tδ
an order of magnitude larger. M-GP-LUCB and M-G-LUCB provide
similar performances in terms of Tδ , but the former identifies the
maximin profile more frequently than the latter. While always using
the maximum number of rounds T , GP-SE is the best algorithm in
identifying the maximin profile.
Results on Infinite SBGs. Figure 1 provides the values of ϵ and ϵˆ
for an instance generated from a Matérn kernel with ν = 2.5 (see
Appendix E in the Supplementary Material for more results). In all
the instances, ϵˆ is lower than ϵ , empirically proving the correctness
of the theoretical guarantees provided in Section 6. Moreover, as
expected, ϵˆ decreases as the number of discretization points Kϵ
increases.
7.2 Security Game Instances
We also test on a SBG instance with infinite strategy spaces inspired
by the real-world security game setting described in Section 1. This
game models a military scenario in which a terrestrial counter-air
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Figure 1: ϵ vs. ϵˆ for different values ofKϵ (Matérnkernelwith
ν = 2.5).
defensive unit has to fire a heat-seeking missile to an approaching
enemy airplane, which, after the missile has been launched, can
deploy an obfuscating flare so as to try to deflect it. We call this
game Hit-the-Spitfire. The model underlying such game and the
parameters used in the experiment are depicted in Figure 3, where
h⊥ is the distance between the airplane and the terrestrial unit, hf
is the distance of the flare from the plane, va and vd are the speed
of the missile and the plane, respectively, while ℓ is the length of the
plane, with the flare covering half of this space ( ℓ2 ). The first player
(the counter-air defensive unit) can determine the angle θ ∈ [0, 1]
(radians) at which the missile is launched, while the second player
(the airplane) has to decide the position s ∈ [0, smax] where to
release the flare. If the missile hits the plane, then it incurs damage
d ∈ R+ that depends on the hitting point (the nearer to the center of
the plane, the higher). If the missile hits the flare, then there is some
probability that it is deflected away from the airplane, otherwise,
the missile still hits the target. The probability of deflection is large
when the distance of the airplane from the deployed flare is larger. 9
We run the M-GP-LUCB with δ = 0.1.
Results. Figure 2 reports the results of running the M-GP-LUCB
algorithmwith δ = 0.1 on theHit-the-Spitfire game (performing 100
runs for each Kϵ ). Notice that, in most of the cases, ϵˆ is lower than
the theoretical value ϵ . This is unexpected, since, in this setting,
the assumption that the utility function u is drawn from a GP does
not hold. We remark that, in all the runs, M-GP-LUCB is able to
identify the maximin strategy profile over the given grid.
8 DISCUSSION AND FUTUREWORKS
We addressed the problem of learning maximin strategies in two-
player zero-sum SBGs with infinite strategy spaces, providing algo-
rithms with theoretical guarantees. To the best of our knowledge,
we provided the first learning algorithms for infinite SBGs enjoy-
ing δ -PAC theoretical guarantees on the quality of the returned
solutions. This significantly advances the current state of the art
9We provide the complete description of the setting in Appendix D in the Supplemen-
tary Material.
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Figure 2: ϵ vs. ϵˆ for different values of Kϵ (Hit-the-Spitfire
security game).
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Parameter Value
h⊥ 100 m
hf 10 m
va 500 m/s
vd 120 m/s
ℓ 15 m
Figure 3: Scenario for the Hit-the-Spitfire security game in-
stance and values for its parameters used in the experi-
ments.
for SBGs, as dealing with infinite strategies paves the way to the
application of such models in complex real-world settings. The fun-
damental ingredient of our results is the assumption that the utility
functions are drawn from a GP, which allows us to encode function
regularities without relying on specific parametric assumptions,
such as, e.g., linearity.
In future, we will extend our work along different directions. For
instance, we may address the case of general (i.e., non-zero-sum
and with more than two players) SBGs with infinite strategy spaces,
where one seeks for an (approximate) Nash equilibrium. Along
this line, an interesting question is how to generalize our learning
algorithms based on best arm identification techniques to deal with
Nash-equilibrium conditions instead of maximin ones. Another
interesting direction for future works is to study how to apply our
techniques in empirical mechanism design problems [25].
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A OMITTED PROOFS FOR THE FIXED-CONFIDENCE SETTING
We provide the complete proof of Theorem 4.1, which shows that the M-GP-LUCB algorithm (Algorithm 2) proposed in the fixed-confidence
setting is δ -PAC and stops its execution after at most Tδ rounds, as a function of the confidence level δ .
Let us start by recalling a result needed for the proof of Theorem 4.1 and provided in [22, Lemma 5.1], which we formally state using our
notation in the following.
Lemma A.1. Given δ ∈ (0, 1), let bt B 2 log
(
nmπ 2t 2
6δ
)
. Then,
P
(
∀π ∈ Π ∀t ≥ 1 |u(π ) − µt (π )| ≤
√
btσt (π )
)
> 1 − δ . (22)
The proof of Theorem 4.1 also needs the following ancillary result, which, assuming a prior distribution GP(0,k(π ,π ′)) over u, provides
an upper bound on the variance of the posterior distribution at round t .
Lemma A.2. For every strategy profile π ∈ Π, the variance σ 2t (π ) is upper bounded as follows:
σ 2t (π ) ≤
λ
λ
σ 2 + Nt (π )
, (23)
where Nt (π ) denotes the number of rounds in which π has been selected by the algorithm, up to round t .
Proof. Since the estimated variance σ 2t (π ) is nonincreasing in t [32] and the order in which the algorithm selects the strategy profiles
does not influence the estimates, we can upper bound σ 2t (π ) with an estimate obtained using a specific subset of the observations. Here, we
only consider those rounds in which π has been selected. This way, thanks to the Sherman-Morrison inversion formula [17], we have a
closed-form expression for the estimated variance after the strategy profile π has been selected Nt (π ) times. Thus,
σ 2t (π ) ≤ σ 2(Nt (π )) =
λ
λ
σ 2 + Nt (π )
. (24)
□
Theorem 4.1. Using a generic nondecreasing exploration term bt > 0, the M-GP-LUCB algorithm stops its execution after at most Tδ rounds,
where:
Tδ ≤ inf
{
t ∈ N : 8H∗(u)bt λ − λ nm
σ 2
< t
}
. (10)
Specifically, letting bt := 2 log
(
nm π 2 t 2
6δ
)
, the algorithm returns a maximin profile with confidence at least 1 − δ , and:
Tδ ≤ 64H∗(u) λ
(
log
(
64H∗(u) λ π
√
nm
6δ
)
+2 log
(
log
(
64H∗(u)λπ
√
nm
6δ
)))
, (11)
where we require that 64 λ π
√
nm
6δ > 4.85.
Proof. We adapt the proof for the M-LUCB algorithm provided in [9], in which a similar result has been derived for a setting where
the utility values are drawn from distributions with finite support and these distributions are independent (in contrast, in our setting, the
distributions do not have finite support and they are not independent, since we assume that the utility function is drawn from a GP).
Let E be the event in which all the real utility values u(π ), for each π ∈ Π, are contained in the intervals [Lt (π ),Ut (π )] for every round
t ∈ N. Next, we prove the correctness of the algorithm under the assumption that the event E holds.
Since E holds, for every strategy of the first player x ∈ X, the second player’s best response utility u(x ,y∗(x)) cannot be below the lowest
among the lower bounds Lt (x ,y), for y ∈ Y, for every round t . Consequently, this is also true for round Tδ . At round t = Tδ , given how the
stopping rule is defined, we have that the confidence interval of the recommended strategy profile π¯ = (x¯t , ct (x¯t )) is disjoint with all the
intervals of strategy profiles in {(x , ct (x))}x,x¯t . Therefore,
u B u(π¯ ) ≥ µt (π¯ ) −
√
btσt (π¯ ) > max
x ∈X\{x¯t }
(
µt (x ,y∗(x)) +
√
btσt (x ,y∗(x))
)
≥ max
x ∈X\{x¯t }
u(x ,y∗(x)) B u, (25)
where we used the fact that all the utilities are contained in the confidence intervals, since E holds.
Now, we focus on the δ - PAC properties of the algorithm. Since Lemma 10 in [9] is still valid, we have that, given c ∈ [u,u] and t < Tδ , if
E holds, then there exists a strategy profile π = (x ,y) ∈ {π t+1,π t+2} such that:
µt (π ) −
√
btσt (π ) ≤ c ≤ µt (π ) +
√
btσt (π ). (26)
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Let us consider the case in which π , (x ,y∗(x)). We have that the utility u(x ,y∗(x)) of a best response y∗(x) to x is contained in the
confidence interval for π . Indeed, since the algorithm selected the strategy profile π (either at round t + 1 or at round t + 2), it holds:
µt (π ) −
√
btσt (π ) ≤ µt (x ,y∗(x)) −
√
btσt (x ,y∗(x)) ≤ u(x ,y∗(x)). (27)
Moreover, since the event E holds we have that:
µt (π ) +
√
btσt (π ) ≥ u(π ) ≥ u(x ,y∗(x)). (28)
Equations (26), (27), and (28) imply that c and u(x ,y∗(x)) are no further than 2√btσt (π ), the length of the interval. Formally:
|c − u(x ,y∗(x))| ≤ 2
√
btσt (π ). (29)
Recalling that Nt (π ) denotes the number of rounds in which π has been selected by the algorithm up to round t , Lemma A.2 tells us that
σ 2t (π ) ≤ σ 2(Nt (π )), which, together with Equation (29), allows us to show the following:
|c − u(x ,y∗(x))| ≤ 2
√
λbt
λ
σ 2 + Nt (π )
. (30)
Solving for Nt (π ) we get:
Nt (π ) ≤ 4btλ(c − u(x ,y∗(x)))2 −
λ
σ 2
. (31)
Given that E holds, we also have thatu(x ,y∗(x)) is in the confidence interval for π , and, thus, its distance fromu(π ) is smaller than 2√btσt (π ).
Formally:
|u(π ) − u(x ,y∗(x))| ≤ 2
√
btσt (π ). (32)
Using similar arguments as before we have that:
Nt (π ) ≤ 4btλ(u(π ) − u(x ,y∗(x)))2 −
λ
σ 2
. (33)
Finally, since both Equation (31) and Equation (33) should hold at the same time, we have that:
Nt (π ) ≤ 4btλ 1
max
{
(u(π ) − u(x ,y∗(x)))2, (c − u(x ,y∗(x)))2
} − λ
σ 2
. (34)
The case in which π ≡ (x ,y∗(x)) can be treated analogously, since all the results on c ∈ [u,u] are still valid, while the condition in
Equation (32) is always satisfied. Therefore, in this case we have:
Nt (x ,y∗(x)) ≤ 4btλ(c − u(x ,y∗(x)))2 −
λ
σ 2
. (35)
Now, let us choose c B u(x
∗,y∗)+u(x ∗,y∗∗)
2 , where x
∗ denotes a first player’s maximin strategy and, for notational convenience, x∗∗ ∈
argminx ∈X\{x ∗ } u(x ,y∗(x)) is a first player’s maximin strategy when x∗ is removed. Then, let us define H∗(u) :=
∑
π ∈Π c(π ), where, for
every strategy profile π = (x ,y) ∈ Π, c(π ) is defined as follows:
c(π ) B 1
max
{
(u(π ) − u(x ,y∗(x)))2,
(
u(x ∗,y∗(x ∗))+u(x ∗∗,y∗(x ∗∗))
2 − u(x ,y∗(x))
)2} . (36)
Given t ∈ N such that t > 8H∗(u)btλ − λnmσ 2 we have that:
min{Tδ , t} =
t∑
h=1
1{h < Tδ } = 2
∑
h∈2N,h<t
1{h < Tδ } (37)
≤ 2
∑
h∈2N,h<t
1
{
∃π ∈ Π s.t. Nh (π ) ≤ 4bhλc(π ) − λ
σ 2
}
(38)
≤ 2
∑
h∈2N,h<t
∑
π ∈Π
1
{
(x¯h , y¯h ) = π ∨ (x¯h+1, y¯h+1) = π
}
1
{
Nh (π ) ≤ 4btλc(π ) −
λ
σ 2
}
(39)
≤ 4
∑
π ∈Π
(
btλc(x1,x2) − λ
σ 2
)
(40)
= 8H∗(u)btλ − λnm
σ 2
< t , (41)
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where we used the fact that the algorithm takes a decision only on even rounds, and, thus, Tδ is even, and that bt is nondecreasing in t ,
which implies that bt ≥ bh for each h < t . The previous inequality implies that Tδ < t , which ensures that the algorithm returns a strategy
after at most t rounds. Formally:
Tδ ≤ inf
{
t ∈ N : 8H∗(u)btλ − λnm
σ 2
< t
}
. (42)
In conclusion, Lemma A.1 provides an explicit formula for the upper bound on the number of rounds Tδ , in the case in which we require
confidence at least 1 − δ that the event E occurs. Using the prescribed bt B 2 log
(
nmπ 2t 2
6δ
)
we have:
inf
{
t ∈ N : 16H∗(u)λ log
(
nmπ 2t2
6δ
)
− λnm
σ 2
< t
}
≤ inf
{
t ∈ N : 32H∗(u)λ log
(
nmπ 2t2
6δ
)
< t
}
. (43)
Applying Lemma 12 in [12] with α = 2, c1 = 132H ∗(u)λ , c2 =
nmπ 2
6δ , and x = t we get:
τδ ≤ 64H∗(u)λ
(
log
(
64H∗(u)λπ
√
nm
6δ
)
+ 2 log
(
log
(
64H∗(u)λπ
√
nm
6δ
)))
, (44)
which holds provided that 64λπ
√
nm
6δ > 4.85. □
B OMITTED PROOFS FOR THE FIXED-BUDGET SETTING
We provide the complete proof of Theorem 5.1, which shows that the GP-SE algorithm (Algorithm 3) with T rounds available returns a
maximin profile with probability at least 1 − δT .
Theorem 5.1. Letting T be the number of available rounds, the GP-SE algorithm returns a maximin strategy profile π∗ with confidence at
least 1 − δT , where:
δT = 2P(n +m − 2)e
− T−P
8λlog(P )H2 , (15)
and H2 B maxi ∈{1, ...,P } i ∆−2(i) .
Proof. Let us focus on the probability that the algorithm excludes a maximin profile π∗ = (x∗,y∗(x∗)) during a specific phase p ∈
{1, . . . P − 1}. There exist two different sources of error, which occur in a disjoint way. In the first case, the algorithm has already discarded
all the strategy profiles in {(x∗,y)}y∈Y:(x ∗,y),π ∗ , while, in the second one, there are some strategy profiles left in such set. Let us define the
following events:
Ep =
{
Πp−1 ∩ {π∗} = {π∗}
}
∩
{
Πp ∩ {π∗} = ∅
}
, (45)
F =
{
∀y , y∗(x∗) ∈ Y Πp−1 ∩ {(x∗,y)} = ∅
}
. (46)
Then, the probability that the algorithm makes an error during the learning process is:
P(E) B
P−1∑
k=1
P(Ep ) =
P−1∑
p=1
P(Ep ∩ F ) + P(Ep ∩ FC ) =
P−1∑
p=1
P(Ep ∩ FC ) +
P−1∑
p=m−1
P(Ep ∩ F ) (47)
=
P−1∑
p=1
P
(
∃y , y∗(x∗) ∈ Y s.t. min
y∈Y
µp (x∗,y) ≤ min
π ∈Πp
µp (π ) ∧ ∀y ∈ Y µp (π∗) ≥ µp (x∗,y)
)
+
+
P−1∑
p=m−1
P
(
∀x ∈ X \ {x∗},∀y ∈ Y µp (π∗) ≤ µp (x ,y)
)
(48)
≤
P−1∑
p=1
P
(
∀y ∈ Y µp (π∗) ≥ µp (x∗,y)
)
+
P−1∑
p=m−1
P
(
∀x ∈ X \ {x∗} µp (π∗) ≤ µp (x ,y∗(x))
)
(49)
≤
P−1∑
p=1
∑
y∈Y\{y∗(x ∗)}
P
(
µp (π∗) ≥ µp (x∗,y)
)
+
P−1∑
p=m−1
∑
x ∈X\{x ∗ }
P
(
µp (π∗) ≤ µp (x ,y∗(x))
)
(50)
=
P−1∑
p=1
∑
y∈Y\{y∗(x ∗)}
P
(
µp (π∗) − u(π∗) − ∆(x
∗,y)
2 − µp (x
∗,y) + u(x∗,y) − ∆(x
∗,y)
2 ≥ 0
)
+
12
+P−1∑
p=m−1
∑
x ∈X\{x ∗ }
P
(
µp (π∗) − u(π∗) + ∆(x ,y
∗(x))
2 − µp (x ,y
∗(x)) + u(x ,y∗(x)) + ∆(x ,y
∗(x))
2 ≤ 0
)
(51)
≤
P−1∑
p=1
∑
y∈Y\{y∗(x ∗)}
©­«e
− ∆2(x∗,y)
8σ 2p (π ∗) + e
− ∆2(x∗,y)
8σ 2p (x∗,y) ª®¬ +
P−1∑
p=m−1
∑
x ∈X\{x ∗ }
©­«e
− ∆2(x,y∗(x ))
8σ 2p (π ∗) + e
− ∆2(x,y∗(x ))
8σ 2p (x,y∗(x )) ª®¬ (52)
≤
P−1∑
p=1
∑
y∈Y\{y∗(x ∗)}
2e−
(
λ
σ 2
+Tp
)
∆2(x∗,y)
8λ +
P−1∑
p=m−1
∑
x ∈X\{x ∗ }
2e−
(
λ
σ 2
+Tp
)
∆2(x,y∗(x ))
8λ (53)
= 2 ©­«
P−1∑
p=1
∑
y∈Y\{y∗(x ∗)}
e−
Tp∆2(x∗,y)
8λ +
P−1∑
p=m−1
∑
x ∈X\{x ∗ }
e−
Tp∆2(x,y∗(x ))
8λ
ª®¬ , (54)
where in Equation (51) we defined ∆(x∗,y) B u(x∗,y) − u(π∗) and ∆(x ,y∗(x)) B u(π∗) − u(x ,y∗(x)). Note that the second summation is
from p =m − 1 since, even in the worst case in which the algorithm first dismisses only strategy profiles (x∗,y) for y , y∗(x∗) ∈ Y, during
the phases p ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}, there is still at least one profile (x∗,y) , π∗ in Πp .
Using a phase length strategy as defined in [1], i.e., Tp =
⌈
T−P
log(P )(P+1−p)
⌉
, where log(P) = 12 +
∑P
i=2
1
i , we obtain the following:
P(E) ≤ 2 ©­«
P−1∑
p=1
(m − 1)e−
T−P
8λlog(P )H +
P−1∑
p=m−1
(n − 1)e−
T−P
8λlog(P )H ª®¬ (55)
≤ 2P(n +m − 2)e−
T−P
8λlog(P )H2 , (56)
where H2 B maxi i∆−2(i) and ∆(i) is the i-th difference between a generic strategy profile π i and the maximin one π
∗ = (x∗,y∗(x∗)), or,
formally, ∆(i) B |u(π∗) − u(π i )| with ∆(1) ≤ ∆(2) ≤ . . . ≤ ∆(P ).
This concludes the proof. □
C OMITTED PROOFS FOR SIMULATION-BASED GAMES WITH INFINITE STRATEGY SPACES
We provide a complete proof of Theorem 6.1 and Corollaries 6.2 and 6.3.
Theorem 6.1. Assume that u is drawn from a GP(0,k(π ,π ′)) satisfying Assumption 1. Given ϵ > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 2), let π = (x¯ , y¯) ∈ Π be a
maximin strategy profile for a finite game Γ(K) where K is at least Kϵ B
⌈
b
2ϵ
√
log
(
4a
δ
) ⌉
+ 1. Then, the following holds:
P
( u(π∗) − u(π ) ≤ ϵ) ≥ 1 − δ2 . (18)
Proof. Under Assumption 1, it is possible to show that the following holds:
|u(π ) − u(x ′,y)| ≤ L|x − x ′ | ∀π = (x ,y) ∈ Π,∀x ′ ∈ X (57)
|u(π ) − u(x ,y′)| ≤ L|y − y′ | ∀π = (x ,y) ∈ Π,∀y′ ∈ Y (58)
with probability 1 − 2ae− L
2
b2 , for any L > 0.
We divide the analysis in two cases: depending on whether the maximin utility value u(π∗) for the original game with infinite strategy
spaces is larger than the one for the finite discretized game, or not. First, we focus on the former case. We show how to bound the difference
u(π∗) − u(π ) > 0. Note that, with a discretization of Π made of at least h =
⌈
b
2ϵ
√
log
(
4a
δ
)⌉
intervals per dimension, there exists at least one
first player’s strategy in the discretized game, namely xд , such that the distance between a maximin strategy x∗ in the original game and the
closest strategy on the grid xд is less than or equal to h2 . Notice that y
∗(xд), i.e., a second player’s best response in the original game to xд ,
differs at most of h2 from y
∗
д(xд), i.e., a second player’s best response to xд in the discretized game. Therefore, we have that:
u(π∗) − u(π ) = u(π∗) − u(x∗,y∗д(xд)) + u(x∗,y∗д(xд)) − u(xд ,y∗д(xд)) + u(xд ,y∗д(xд)) − u(π ) (59)
= min
y∈Y
u(x∗,y) − u(x∗,y∗д(xд))︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
≤0
+u(x∗,y∗д(xд)) − u(xд ,y∗д(xд))︸                                ︷︷                                ︸
L |x ∗−xд |
+u(xд ,y∗д(xд)) − u(π )︸                    ︷︷                    ︸
<0
(60)
≤ L2h , (61)
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where we used Equation (57) and the fact that u(π ) is larger than the utility value of any other best response of the second player and,
specifically, also larger than u(xд ,y∗д(xд)).
Now, let us consider the second case, i.e., the maximin utility value u(π∗) for the original game is smaller than the one for the finite
discretized game. We provide a bound on the difference u(π ) −u(π∗) > 0. Let us assume that x∗ is on the grid. Then, the distance of π∗ from
a second player’s best response in the discretized game should be less than 12h . Therefore, its value cannot be lower than u(xд ,y∗д(xд)) − L2h
for every xд on the grid. From its definition we have that:
u(π∗) > max
xд
(
u(xд ,y∗д(xд)) −
L
2h
)
= max
xд
u(xд ,y∗д(xд)) −
L
2h = u(π ) −
L
2h , (62)
which implies that u(π ) − u(π∗) ≤ L2h . Since the maximum over a larger set cannot decrease, we have that this result holds also in the case
x∗ is not on the grid. Overall we have that |u(π∗) − u(π )| ≤ L2h .
Choosing L = b
√
log
(
4a
δ
)
, we have that:
|u(π∗) − u(π )| ≤
b
√
log
(
4a
δ
)
2
⌈
b
2ϵ
√
log
(
4a
δ
)⌉ ≤ ϵ, (63)
which holds with probability at least 1 − δ2 . □
Corollary C.1. Assume that u is drawn from a GP(0,k(π ,π ′)) satisfying Assumption 1. Given ϵ > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), letting bt :=
2 log
(
nmπ 2t 2
3δ
)
, the M-GP-LUCB algorithm applied to Γ(K) with K at least Kϵ B
⌈
b
2ϵ
√
log
(
4a
δ
) ⌉
+ 1 returns a strategy profile π = (x¯ , y¯) such
that P (|u(π∗) − u(x¯ ,y∗(x¯))| ≤ ϵ) ≥ 1 − δ . Moreover, the algorithm stops its execution after at most:
Tδ,ϵ ≤ 64H∗(u) λ
[
log
(
64H∗(u) λ π Kϵ
√
1
3δ
)
+2 log
(
log
(
64H∗(u)λ π Kϵ
√
1
3δ
))]
, (19)
where we require that 64 λ π Kϵ
√
1
3δ > 4.85.
Proof. Using Theorem 4.1 with bt := 2 log
(
nmπ 2t 2
3δ
)
and Applying Lemma 12 in [12] with α = 2 c1 = 132H ∗(u)λ , c2 =
nmπ 2
3δ and x = t
we have that after at most:
Tδ ≤ 64H∗(u)λ
(
log
(
64H∗(u)λπ
√
nm
3δ
)
+ 2 log
(
log
(
64H∗(u)λπ
√
nm
3δ
)))
(64)
the M-GP-LUCB algorithm returns a maximin strategy profile for the finite discretized game with probability at least 1 − δ2 . Then, using
Theorem 6.1, we have an error with respect to a maximin profile of the original game of at most ϵ , with a probability of at least 1 − δ2 .
Overall, using a union bound, the statement of the theorem holds with probability at least 1 − δ . The number of rounds, with the chosen
discretization, becomes:
τδ ≤ 64H∗(u)λ
(
log
(
64H∗(u)λπKϵ
√
1
3δ
)
+ 2 log
(
log
(
64H∗(u)λπKϵ
√
1
3δ
)))
, (65)
which concludes the proof. □
Corollary C.2. Assume that u is drawn from a GP(0,k(π ,π ′)) satisfying Assumption 1. Given ϵ > 0 and δ ∈ (0, 1), letting T be the number
of available rounds, the GP-SE algorithm applied to Γ(K) with K at least Kϵ B
⌈
b
2ϵ
√
log
(
4a
δ
) ⌉
+ 1 returns a profile π = (x¯ , y¯) such that
P (|u(π∗) − u(x¯ ,y∗(x¯))| > ϵ) < δT ,ϵ , where:
δT ,ϵ = 4K2ϵ (Kϵ − 1)e
− T−K2ϵ
8λlog(K2ϵ )H2 + 2ae−
b2
4ϵ2(Kϵ −1)2 . (20)
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Proof. The proof is obtained by setting δ ′ = 2δ in Theorem 6.1, which assures that the error with respect to a maximin strategy profile
computed over Π is at most ϵ with a probability at least 1 − δ ′, and using Theorem 5.1 with K = K2ϵ . As a result, we get:
Kϵ − 1 =

b
2ϵ
√
log
(
2a
δ ′
) =⇒ δ ′ ≤ 2ae−
b2
4ϵ2(Kϵ −1)2 . (66)
□
Theorem 6.4. Assume that u is drawn from a GP(0,k(π ,π ′)) satisfying Assumption 1. Given δ ∈ (0, 2), let π = (x¯ , y¯) ∈ Xn × Ym be a
maximin strategy profile for a finite game Γ = (Xn ,Ym ,u). Then, the following holds:
P
©­«
u(π∗) − u(π ) ≤ b√log ( 4a
δ
)
max
{
dmaxx ,d
max
y
}ª®¬ ≥ 1 − δ2 .
Proof. The proof follows from the proof of Theorem 6.1, by substituting dmaxx as the maximum distance between one of the available
strategies of the first players and x∗ ∈ X (instead of 12h ) and dmaxy as the maximum distance between one of the strategies of the second
players and y∗ ∈ X (instead of 12h )
Specifically, letting xд be the closest strategy in Xn to the maximin strategy x∗, if u(π∗) − u(π ) > 0, we have:
u(π∗) − u(π ) ≤ L|x∗ − xд | ≤ Ldmaxx .
Conversely, if u(π∗) − u(π ) < 0, and x∗ ∈ Xn we have:
u(π∗) > max
xд
(
u(xд ,y∗д(xд)) − L|y∗д(xд) − y∗ |
)
≥ max
xд
u(xд ,y∗д(xд)) − Ldmaxy = u(π ) − Ldmaxy , (67)
and for the properties of the maximum we have that the result also holds if x∗ < Xn .
Finally, using the fact that −Ldmaxy ≤ u(π∗) − u(π ) ≤ Ldmaxx , we have that:
|u(π∗) − u(π )| ≤ Lmax
{
dmaxx ,d
max
y
}
= b
√
log
(
4a
δ
)
max
{
dmaxx ,d
max
y
}
, (68)
where we used the definition of L, and we choose that Assumption 1 holds with probability at least 1 − δ2 . This concludes the proof. □
D FULL DESCRIPTION OF THE HIT-THE-SPITFIRE SECURITY GAME
In this section, we provide a complete description of the Hit-the-Spitfire security game introduced in Section 7 (see also Figure 3). In such game,
the first player is a terrestrial counter-air defensive unit that has to hit an approaching enemy airplane with a surface-to-air heat-seeking
missile.
The defender becomes aware of the airplane presence when it ish⊥ meters far away. Then, immediately after detection time, the counter-air
unit has to launch a missile with an angle θ ∈ [0, 1] (in radians) with respect to the direction along which the airplane has been detected.
The maximum angle is determined by the finite amount of fuel in the missile.
We assume, for simplicity, that the airplane is moving along the direction perpendicular to the line passing through the defensive unit and
the point where the plane is detected, with a constant speed vd . The missile moves along the straight line determined by θ with a constant
speed va > vd .
The airplane can deploy a flare with the intent of deflecting the missile, and it has to choose where to do it, expressed in terms of distance
s ∈ [0, smax] measured starting from the point where the airplane has been detected. Notice that smax represents the maximum distance from
the detection point at which the missile can hit the plane, given the amount of fuel available. Formally,
smax =
vdh
va cos(1) .
The flare acts at a distance of hf meters from the airplane. We denote with ℓ the length of the airplane (in meters), while the flare covers an
area large ℓ2 meters around the point where it is deployed.
When the missile hits the airplane, the latter suffers a damage d ∈ [0, 1], which represents the defender’s utility u (or, equivalently, the
opposite of the airplane utility). The damage is maximal if the airplane is hit at its middle point, while it decreases if the hitting point moves
towards the extremes. Formally:
d(x) = − 4
ℓ2
x2 + 1,
where x is the hitting point (in meters) starting from the tail of the plane.
For simplicity, we equivalently express the second player’s strategy s as sd = ssmax , so that sd ∈ [0, 1].
The game outcome is determined as follows. If the missile trajectory does not intercept the flare and intercepts the airplane shape, then
the missile hits the plane, dealing damage.. If the missile intercepts the flare, then it is deflected away from the airplane with some probability.
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Algorithm 4 Interaction of the Hit-the-Spitfire Game
The first player (defender) selects θ ∈ [0, 1]
The second player (airplane) selects sd ∈ [0, 1] (or, equivalently, s ∈ [0, smax])
if sdsmax − ℓ4 ≤ (h⊥ − hf ) tanθ ≤ sdsmax + ℓ4 then
Generate a sample p from Be
(
1 − |sd smax−xd |smax
)
if p = 1 then
Generate a sample q from a uniform distributionU ([− ℓ2 , ℓ2 ])
Deal damage d = d(q)
else
Deal damage d = 0
else
if vd
h⊥
va cos(θ ) −
ℓ
2 ≤ h⊥ tan(θ ) ≤ vd h⊥va cos(θ ) +
ℓ
2 then
Deal damage d = d
( vdva cos(θ ) − h⊥ tan(θ ))
else
Deal damage d = 0
Specifically, it still hits the airplane with a probability proportional to the angle between the flare and the missile. For the sake of simplicity,
we model this process as a Bernoulli with mean 1− |sd smax−xd |smax , where xd is the position of the airplane (measured starting from the detection
point) when the flare was hit. In the case of a hit, the hitting point is uniformly chosen over the plane asU
(
[− ℓ2 , ℓ2 ]
)
.
The overall process of computing the utility u is depicted in Algorithm 4.
Intercepting the Flare. The missile intercepts the flare after the time necessary to travel the vertical distance ya = h⊥ − hf . Since its
vertical speed is va cos(θ ), such time is t = yava cos(θ ) =
h⊥−hf
va cos(θ ) . The space covered in the horizontal direction by the missile is now
xa = (h − hf ) tanθ . Therefore, we have that the missile hits the flare when:
sdsmax −
ℓ
4 ≤ xa ≤ sdsmax +
ℓ
4 , (69)
sdsmax −
ℓ
4 ≤ (h⊥ − hf ) tanθ ≤ sdsmax +
ℓ
4 . (70)
Intercepting the Airplane. Assuming the flare did not intercept the missile, the latter hits the airplane after the time necessary to travel the
vertical distance ya = h. Since its vertical speed is va cos(θ ), such time is t = yava cos(θ ) =
h
va cos(θ ) . Thus, te missile intercepts the plane if:
xd −
ℓ
2 ≤ xa ≤ xd +
ℓ
2 , (71)
vd
h⊥
va cos(θ ) −
ℓ
2 ≤ h⊥ tan(θ ) ≤ vd
h⊥
va cos(θ ) +
ℓ
2 . (72)
E ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
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(a) ϵ vs. ϵˆ for different values of Kϵ (Matérn kernel with ν = 1.5).
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(b) ϵ vs. ϵˆ for different values of Kϵ (squared exponential kernel with
l = 1.5).
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